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A theoretical model is constructed and tested to 
describe how some interest groups affect each other's 
campaign contributions to legislators. The model extends 
Becker's (1983) reaction functions for pressure groups with 
competing policy goals to reaction functions for pressure 
groups with homogeneous policy goals. The model is 
empirically tested by estimating interest group donations 
made to the 104th U.S. Congress by four categories of 
interest groups. Empirical results indicate that interest 
groups with competing policy goals exhibit positively sloped 
reaction functions while groups with homogeneous policy 
goals experience negatively sloped reaction functions. 
Finally, the estimated contributions are used in determining 
a probit estimate of roll-call voting data from the 104th 
U.S. House of Representatives. The probit estimates provide 
some evidence that interest groups are effective in 
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Since the advent of the public choice school, the 
organization of congress and the transactions with its 
agents are often defined using economic tools. Empirical 
evidence has supported theoretical models that interest 
groups are influential in determining the outcome of 
congressional votes on public policy. The questions 
addressed herein are: How do interest groups allocate
political resources when other interest groups with 
homogeneous and competing policy goals are involved? Does 
an interest group affect the pressure exerted by other 
interest groups with campaign contributions? For example, 
how do contributions made by environmental groups affect 
those made by groups with similar policy goals, such as the 
maritime unions? At the same time, how do contributions 
made by the same environmental groups affect those made by 
groups with competing policy goals, such as pro-industry 
groups?
The purpose of this research is to construct and test a 
model that will represent the pressure exerted by interest 
groups with homogeneous and competitive policy goals. The 
theoretical model is based on Becker (1983) and draws 
extensively from public choice and oligopoly theory. A model 
for estimating reaction functions is derived for interest 
groups with competing and homogeneous policy goals,
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respectively. The testable hypothesis is that groups who 
compete have positively sloped reaction functions and groups 
who cooperate have negatively sloped reaction functions.
The model is empirically tested by estimating interest 
group donations made to the 104th U.S. Congress. 
Contributions are estimated by both three-stage least 
squares and two-stage Tobit techniques. Finally the 
estimated contributions are used to estimate roll-call 
voting data for legislation aimed at lifting the Alaska Oil 
Export Ban by applying a limited dependent variable 
econometric procedure. The results from the vote estimates 
using three-stage least squares are compared to the results 
obtained when contributions are estimated using the two- 
stage Tobit method.
Empirical results are based on an analysis of 
contributions to members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives by four interest groups, oil producers, oil 
refineries, the merchant marine, and environmental 
organizations, and on six votes in the 104th U.S. House of 
Representatives during 1995. The results using the three- 
stage least squares model were highly encouraging. Evidence 
of cooperation exists among those interest groups opposed to 
lifting the Alaska oil export ban and evidence of 
competition exists between these groups and the group who 
stood to gain from lifting the ban. The two-stage Tobit
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estimate of contributions was less convincing. However, 
when Tobit estimates for contributions were used in the 
Probit estimate of votes, the hypothesis that interest group 
contributions affected policy is supported.
Varying interest groups may have several different 
policies about which they are concerned and contributions 
may have been directed at influencing other bills. This may 
have influenced estimates of the reaction function slopes 
and the effect of contributions on the vote estimates. 
However, evidence was found that politicians, at least, are 
able to distinguish between policies and their effects on 
interest groups and that interest groups are effective in 





The application of economic analysis to political 
structures has helped researchers understand the political 
process. Explaining regulation the first problem addressed 
in this way, most notably by Public Choice economists such 
as George Stigler, Sam Peltzman and Gary Becker. Others 
such as Chappell (1981, 1982), Kau and Rubin (1982) and Kau, 
Keenan and Rubin (1982) provided empirical evidence to 
support the postulation that interest groups play a 
significant role in influencing the outcome of legislation. 
Essentially, political participation can be analyzed from an 
economic perspective in which economic agents are acting 
rationally in order to maximize utility.
The economic solution to the question of the nature of 
political organization begins with the work of Downs (1957) 
and Buchanan and Tullock (1966) who examined the nature of 
bureaucratic organizations. Both described political agents 
as rational, that is, they seek to maximize their utility 
subject to constraints. Application of this assumption at 
the legislative level depicts representatives voting in such 
a way as to increase their likelihood of reelection. 
Constituents go about making electoral decisions in a 
similarly rational fashion. They will devote resources,
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i.e. time, money and effort, to the elective process up to 
the point that marginal cost is equal to the marginal 
benefit brought about by a candidate's victory. Previous 
approaches to explaining political behavior either fell 
short or were not supported by empirical research.
1.2 Previous Theories of Regulation
The Normative Analysis as Positive Theory (NPT) of 
economic regulation postulates that the government will 
intervene and regulate a market when the potential for 
failure exists within a market. An example of this is a 
market in which the costs are arranged so that a natural 
monopoly is the only market structure under which the 
product will be supplied. Another instance is when an 
externality occurs as a result of production. The 
externality can be either positive or negative. So, 
according to the NPT school, regulation will occur to 
improve social welfare via granting monopoly rights or price 
setting or through imposing taxes or subsidies. The NPT 
School uses normative analysis to generate a positive theory 
of regulation. In other words, NPT uses what ought to be to 
explain what is occurring in the market.
The shortcoming of NPT is that while it can provide an 
explanation of the existence of regulation, it fails to 
offer an explanation of the mechanisms occurring to bring
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forth that regulation. NPT alleges that regulation occurs 
through the legislative process in response to demand for it 
generated by the market failure. However, NPT neglects to 
address the political dynamics under which the regulation 
evolves. The potential net welfare gains which induce 
legislators to design and pass legislation are not addressed 
under NPT. NPT explains how but not why. Other criticisms 
of NPT include historical accounts of regulation occurring 
in an industry when a market failure does not exist. If NPT 
were to hold true, these regulations should not have existed 
and firms would have not lobbied for and supported 
legislation. Additionally, others have shown regulation to 
be ineffective. The NPT attempted to correct itself by 
saying that regulation was originally implemented to correct 
market failures but is mismanaged by the regulatory agency. 
However, this new explanation is still subject to the same 
criticism.
The Capture Theory (CT) of regulation responded to the 
insufficiency of NPT to explain regulation in absence of 
market failure. The theory presumes that regulation does 
not occur in response to market failure and may even promote 
market failure. CT states that regulation is supplied by 
legislators in response to the industry's demand for 
regulation. Eventually, the regulator becomes controlled, 
or captured, by the industry over time. CT merely supposes
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that the regulator is controlled by the industry but does 
not describe how the industry is able to do so. CT fails to 
take into account those markets in which industry does not 
benefit from regulation and subsequently does not support 
it. Also, the theory fails to take into consideration the 
other interest groups involved in regulation such as 
consumers, labor unions, and political activists. Finally, 
it fails to explain why industry is regulated and later 
deregulated.
1.3 Public Choice
The first researchers to bring forth economic
explanations to political questions used a positive analysis
that sought to dissect voting rules (Black 1958), political
institutions and the economic underpinnings of
constitutions. Their ideas belong under the auspices of
Public Choice. Concisely stated by Buchanan (1979),
Public Choice theory essentially takes the tools 
and methods of approach that have been developed 
to quite sophisticated analytical levels in 
economic theory and applies these tools and 
methods to the political or governmental sector, 
to politics, to the public economy.
These revolutionaries constructed their theories with the
premise that voters, legislators and interest groups act
rationally and strive to maximize utility. Unlike previous
theories, Public Choice takes into account the non-
quantifiable aspects of utility maximization. For example,
15
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representatives can vote consistent with their own ideology 
and gain utility through intrinsic satisfaction (Kalt and 
Zupan 1990). Additionally, political transactions result in 
clearly defined, all-or-nothing winners and losers. Unlike 
market transactions, which occur at the margin, a political 
transaction, in the form of voting, does not provide every 
participant with the desired outcome.
To define who would be regulated and what form the 
regulation would take was first addressed when George 
Stigler applied economic analysis to regulation. He 
presupposed that agents act to maximize their own utility 
and that the basic resource of the state is its power to 
coerce. (Stigler 1971) So, in order to improve its well 
being, the interest group attempts to persuade the state to 
use its power to force regulation toward the position 
favored by the interest group.
Sam Peltzman (1976) expanded on Stigler's theory by 
defining which industries will realize the bulk of benefits 
from regulation and consequently, what regulations will be 
implemented as a result of the interest group's influence. 
Like Stigler, Peltzman assumed that legislators, interest 
groups and voters behave to maximize their own utility. He 
put constituents on the demand side and legislators on the 
supply side of the market and explained why small interest
groups dominate regulatory policy by relating group size 
with the costs of political action.
In the Stigler/Peltzman world, legislators choose 
policy to maximize political support that is derived from 
constituent votes and interest group finances. A legislator 
must decide upon the group to benefit from legislation and 
secures support from that group. Support can be either 
resources, which includes campaign contributions and granted 
services from members, or direct votes. Other interest 
groups will resist the policy and the legislator will be met 
with opposition at the voting booth. The net effect of the 
legislator's chosen policy is the political support that is 
maximized for the interest groups' level of resources.
The Peltzman model concludes that regulation benefits 
small, well-organized interest groups with strongly felt 
preferences. The cost of regulation is born by the larger, 
less organized interest groups with relatively lower per 
capita costs than smaller, more organized interest groups. 
The point at which marginal cost is equal to marginal 
revenue determines who will gain from legislation. Their 
theory explains why much of regulatory policies benefit 
industry while not necessarily maximizing social welfare.
The next central collection of Public Choice literature 
consists of econometric models to explain the determinants 
of congressional votes. Chappell (1981, 1982) tested
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various single equation and simultaneous models for their 
explanatory power. Binary dependent variable techniques 
such as Probit and Tobit are more useful than OLS techniques 
modeling congressional votes and campaign contributions due 
to the constrained values of the dependent variables 
(Chappell 1981). Using a simultaneous Probit-Tobit model to 
estimate the propensity to vote in an interest groups favor, 
he determined that interest group donations possess 
inconclusive explanatory power (Chappell 1982). The 
argument that constituent ideology yields more clout with 
the voting congressman is substantiated by the research. 
Chappell, however, only includes one interest group as 
possessing influence for each of the congressional votes 
tested when in reality more than one interest group may have 
a stake in the passage of any one policy. Others such as 
Kau and Rubin (1978), Kau, Keenan and Rubin (1982), Peltzman 
(1984), and Pashigan (1984) found evidence supporting the 
influence of interest groups on legislative votes by testing 
roll-call data.
The next noteworthy theoretical proposition describes 
the mechanism by which organized interest groups compete for 
political influence. Gary Becker (1983) developed a 
relationship between organized interest groups rooted in the 
work of Stigler, Peltzman and Posner. Like those before 
him, he points out that interest groups, or pressure groups,
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are compelled to pressure legislators i.e., provide them 
with resources, in order to influence policy. However, 
Becker demonstrates that "pressure by each group reduces 
influence of the other (competing) group, and thereby 
partially or fully offsets the effect of pressure by the 
other group" (1983 p. 378). Positively sloped reaction 
curves are derived to illustrate the relationship between 
the pressure exerted by any number of competing interest 
groups.
1.4 Congress as a Firm: The Economics of Politics
If the political arena is to be explained in economic 
terms, the theories which illustrate the firm behavior in 
the marketplace should also give insight into the behavior 
of legislators within congress. The firm faces production 
decisions based on input prices and consumer demand for its 
final product, neither of which are fully controlled by the 
non-monopolistic firm. However, the firm does make 
decisions about how much to produce and the methods by which 
to employ production. In other words, the firm decides 
which production techniques will minimize costs at the 
available input prices. And, it will produce a quantity 
that maximizes profits subject to demand. Clearly, this can 
be applied to the production decisions that a legislator 
makes contingent upon obtainable resources. Basically, the
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legislator's "profit" is the net political support of 
constituents realized by his legislative decisions.
The decisions made by voters at the polls are affected 
by various conditions. The demographic characteristics of 
the constituency determined by values and economic position 
will impel voters to support the candidate who advances a 
position supporting similar values. However, voters, like 
consumers, are rational. A voter will expend resources 
towards election information until the marginal cost of 
obtaining information is equal to the marginal benefit of 
having that information. For example a voter employed in 
the telecommunications industry will have less to risk with 
fishery regulation than the voter employed in a fishery 
related occupation. Therefore, the former voter will expend 
fewer resources to gain information about fishery 
legislation than the latter. Each voter has relatively 
little influence on the outcome of the election.
Congress, in order to minimize transaction costs, is 
organized in comparable ways to a firm. To see why, it is 
necessary to examine the attributes of political decision 
making within a community. If unanimous votes were required 
in deciding legislation, few bills would be up for a vote.
In this scenario, subtle variations in each individual's 
preferences would result in extensive bargaining (Black 
1958). By electing legislators, each constituent reduces
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transactions costs by choosing the candidate whose political 
position most closely resembles his or her own. Political 
organization can be explained with the same reasoning by 
which vertical integration of a firm is explained by 
theories of industrial organization.
There exist unique problems to political markets not 
found in ordinary commodity markets that are due to the 
structure of our political system. A constituents decisions 
are made at once, during the election, while market 
decisions are made when each economic choice presents 
itself. The representation of voters by elected officials 
is the political solution to this obstacle. Therefore, each 
voter must make a collective decision about his or her 
position on a number of issues, whether or not the voter 
finds all the issues to be relevant. Decisions made by 
voting are made by the entire community, not only by those 
members who are effected by each particular legislative 
issue. This leads to a second defect, the misrepresentation 
of agents in the political market. Each community member is 
allowed to make decisions regarding policy, not according to 
whether or not that person is effected by the legislation or 
the extent of its effect. (Stigler 1971)
It is difficult to distinguish why a congressman votes 
for a specific piece of legislation, so problems plaguing 
informal contractual agreements within congress include
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imperfect observation and incomplete contracts. The 
incentives for casting a particular vote can be multiple and 
each member of Congress has 434 potential trading partners 
with which to enter into an agreement. Suppose that several 
legislators agree to support the each other's preferred 
bills, but those bills are scheduled for a vote at different 
dates. This process of deal making within congress, 
logrolling, is often conducted explicitly and results in 
ratification of bills that otherwise would not be approved 
(Tullock).
To exacerbate the situation, the non-simultaneity of 
congressional votes leads to difficulty in enforcing 
logrolling agreements. Once the vote is conducted on one 
member's bill, that member has little incentive to follow 
through with the agreed upon vote for subsequent bills. So, 
there is no explicit ex post incentive for the legislator to 
follow through on a logrolling agreement after the preferred 
bill is passed. However, this is a repeated game in which 
past results can effect the strategy of players in 
subsequent rounds. So, if one player fails to follow 
through on a previous voting agreement, the other 
participants may be reluctant to engage in future agreements 
with that individual. This constitutes the incentive for 




LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OIL EXPORT BAN
2.1 Introduction
The twenty-two year ban prohibiting the export of 
Alaska's oil was the product of a tangled web of 
legislation. The ban was bred from the Export Control Act; 
a piece of cold war legislation that banned the export of 
materials deemed strategic to sustaining national security. 
The Alaska Export Ban was explicitly put into place prior to 
construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Amendments to 
the export control act reinforced the ban by explicitly 
referring to the oil produced from Alaska. Subsequent 
legislation prohibiting the export of Alaska's oil is 
replete and contained wording that further prevented foreign 
shipment of Alaskan oil. These laws include the Anti-Arab 
Boycott of Israel Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Act and, 
most significantly, amendments to the Export Administration 
Act.
The existence of the export control act effected 
several interest groups and became the subject of 
controversy for over a decade. The drive to lift the ban 
was led by Alaska's congressional delegation through the 
introduction of amendments aimed at lifting the export ban 
on their state's largest resource. Their arguments for 
lifting the ban were manifold and the team of Senators Frank
23
Murkowski and Ted Stevens and Congressman Don Young were 
successful in obtaining the go ahead to export their state's 
oil in 1995.
2.2 The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act of 1973
The Alaska oil export ban came into existence as part 
of the compromise between the Federal Government and oil 
companies to authorize the rights-of-way for the trans- 
Alaska pipeline in 1973. Upon discovery of the largest 
known oil field in Alaska, Prudhoe Bay, it was determined 
that the only feasible means of transporting the oil was 
through a pipeline to the ice-free Port of Valdez. The 
chosen route passed through federal lands, which, together 
with new environmental assessment requirements, made the 
issue one of federal interest. Debate ensued over the 
shipment of the state's oil since it was subject to the 
mineral leasing act of 1920. Right-of-way had to be granted 
over federal land for the pipeline's construction and the 
mineral leasing act states that no minerals/fuel/gas may be 
exported which is transferred over federal land. John 
Saylor (Republican, PA) sponsored a bill "to provide that no 
crude oil transported over rights-of-way granted under the 
mineral leasing act of 1920 would be exported unless 
congress adopted a concurrent resolution in agreement with a
24
presidential finding that such exports were in the national 
interest."
The possible export of Prudhoe Bay oil also made the 
pipeline an issue of national security. The nation's oil 
supply would be more susceptible to shifts in international 
relations. The trans-Alaska Pipeline Act (PL 93-153) was 
passed amidst concerns of an Arab oil embargo resulting from 
the Arab-Israel conflict in the Middle East. In the Senate, 
Henry Jackson (D-WA) proposed an amendment prohibiting 
exportation of oil to "nail down any talk or discussion that 
this is simply a pipeline that will be used to export oil 
away from the United States" (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, 1973, p. 602). A Jackson amendment prohibiting 
exports unless the president found such exports "would not 
diminish the total quantity or quality of petroleum 
available to the United States," was adopted on July 12,
1973 by a 92-2 vote in the Senate. This amendment was 
reinforced by a second vote, adopted 86-0 on July 16, 1973,
that empowered the Congress to override the president's 
decision to export oil with a simple joint resolution. The 
only close vote on the matter occurred on July 12, when an 
amendment sponsored by Walter Mondale (D-MN) was rejected 
31-62. Mondale's amendment would have substituted for 
Jackson's July 12 amendment permission to export oil "if the
25
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President found it 'essential to remedy an imminent threat 
to national security'" (op. cit., p. 603).
In the House, John Saylor (R-PA) introduced an 
amendment that prohibited export of oil transported over 
rights-of-way granted under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 
unless the Congress adopted a concurrent resolution in 
agreement with a presidential finding that such exports were 
within the national interest. The amendment was adopted by 
voice vote on August 2, 1973. It was substantially stronger 
than the Senate version, since it effectively gave veto 
power to either house of Congress. In the conference 
committee formed to reconcile the differences between the 
Senate and House versions, the House language was adopted. 
The final bill was approved November 12, 1973 by a 361-14 
vote in the House and on November 13, 1973 by the Senate on 
a 80-5 vote.
The prohibition on exportation of Alaska oil also meant 
that any oil transported from Alaska had to be transported 
under U.S. flags and with U.S. crews, the result of 
restrictions from the Maritime Act of 1920.1 In the House, 
Glenn M. Anderson (D-CA) proposed an amendment that would 
require any Alaska oil exported to be carried on U.S. flag
1 This is known in Alaska as the "Jones Act" since it was sponsored by 
Washington Senator Wesley Jones of Seattle. The act had the effect of 
eliminating Vancouver, British Columbia, as a competitor of Seattle in trade 
between Alaska and the states (Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, 1987, 
p. 97).
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vessels. This amendment was rejected by a voice vote on 
August 2, 1973.
2.3 The Anti-Arab Boycott of Israel Act of 1977
The congress returned to the oil export ban in 1977 
while considering how to deal with the Arab boycott against 
Israel and against firms trading with Israel (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, 1977, pp. 352-9) . In addition to 
creating a boycott of trade with the Arab countries, the act 
introduced would prohibit the export of Alaska oil for two 
years except for exchanges with an 'adjacent foreign state' 
for convenience or when the President determined exports to 
other nations would 'have a positive effect on consumer oil 
prices.'
An amendment, the so-called "swapping proposal," 
sponsored by Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY) would have allowed 
exchanges with an 'adjacent foreign state.' Under this 
proposal U.S. East Coast refiners could buy Alaska oil and 
Japanese refiners could purchase oil from the Middle East, 
but the Alaska oil could be shipped to Japan and the Middle 
East oil to the East Coast. However, the House heard a 
substitute proposed by Stewart B. McKinney (R-CT) to 
prohibit exports of Alaska oil for two years. The McKinney 
substitute was adopted by voice vote on April 20, 1977. The 
House version of the bill was passed 364-43 later that day.
The Senate was more amenable to allowing exports of 
Alaskan oil, with the Senate bill under consideration 
containing no provision to that effect. Furthermore, an 
amendment by John A. Durkin (D-NH) to prohibit exports to 
Japan for two years was tabled (killed) in a 66-27 vote on 
May 5, 1977. Thus the major difference between the House 
and Senate versions was whether or not oil exports would be 
allowed. The conference committee adopted the House 
version, which prohibited exports of Alaskan oil except 
under the conditions specified in Solarz' swapping proposal. 
It was also decided that either house could veto a 
presidential recommendation to allow exports. Final passage 
of the bill came on June 10, 1977 with a 306-41 vote in the 
House, following a June 7, 1977 voice vote in the Senate. 
Thus, effectively, the oil export ban was extended for two 
more years.
2.4 The Export Administration Act of 1977
The 1969 Export Control Act was initially intended to 
protect strategic resources during the Cold War by 
restricting exports and was renewed several times. The 1977 
Export Administration Act, which extended its predecessor by 
an additional two years, included a provision that 
"prohibited the export of Alaskan oil for two years, except 
for exchanges with an "adjacent foreign state" for
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convenience or when the president determined exports to 
other nations would "have a positive effect on consumer oil 
prices." Under what was called the swapping procedure, U.S. 
East coast refiners would buy Alaskan oil and Japanese 
refiners would purchase crude from the middle east, but 
Alaskan oil would be shipped to japan and the east cost 
refiners would receive the Middle East oil. The act 
required the President to report to Congress before allowing 
such exports and provided that either house could stop the 
action by passing a resolution of disapproval within sixty 
days after receiving the president's message. The amendment 
was defeated by roll-call vote of 61 to 340. Proponents 
argued that the swap would benefit the US by lowering 
transportation costs, improve the balance of trade, improve 
US relations with Mexico and ease the dependence on the 
Panama Canal. The amendment's opponents argued that the 
Alaskan oil exports would be countered by Mexican oil 
imports and that any improvements in efficiency due to lower 
costs would be absorbed as oil company profits and would not 
benefit consumers.
2.5 The Export Administration Act of 1979
The next major consideration of the oil export ban took 
place in 1979 with the reauthorization of the Export 
Administration Act of 1969 (PL 91-184) , which extended a set
29
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of "cold war" restrictions on trade with communist bloc 
nations (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1979, pp. 3 00- 
305). The reauthorization (PL 96-72) prohibited exports of 
Alaskan oil unless 1) an exchange would not diminish the 
total quantity of oil in the United States, 2) at least 
three-fourths of the savings were passed on to consumers, 3) 
any contract could be canceled if crude oil supplies were 
threatened or diminished, and 4) an exchange was necessary 
to protect the national interest. Senator Ted Stevens (R- 
AK) proposed an amendment that would drop the requirement 
that three-fourths of the savings accrue to consumers, a 
requirement he characterized as "impossible." Donald W. 
Riegle, Jr. (D-MI) countered, saying "the only people who 
stand to gain from the Stevens proposition are the state of 
Alaska, at the expense of the other 49 states, and the oil 
producers" (op. cit., p. 302). The Senate tabled the 
Stevens proposal by a vote of 52-30 on July 21, 1979.
However, an amendment by Thomas F. Eagleton (D-MO) that 
would require both houses of congress to override a 
presidential decision to allow exports under the four 
provisions was supported by a voice vote after a Riegle 
motion to table was rejected by a vote of 34-48. In the 
House, an amendment by William E. Dannemeyer (R-CA) was 
rejected on September 24, 1979 by a vote of 61-340. The 
amendment would have allowed export of Alaska oil to Japan
in exchange for oil imported from Mexico unless "the major 
oil exporting countries have imposed severe restrictions on 
the export of oil to the United States" (op. cit., p. 304).
The conference report, filed September 27, 1979, 
prohibited exports of Alaska oil except for swapping 
arrangements where the four conditions outlined above were 
met. The Senate approved the conference bill by voice vote 
on September 27, 1979, and the House followed with a 321-19 
vote on September 28, 1979. President Carter signed the bill 
September 29, 1979, just one day before the existing 
authority expired. As the conditions of the swapping 
proposal could not be met, the export ban was effectively 
continued.
2.6 Lifting the Oil Export Ban in 1995
Alaska's congressional delegation worked doggedly since 
construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline to show that 
exporting their state's oil would result in greater economic 
efficiency. Oil industry officials and contracted research 
firms testified before both the Senate and House about the 
merits of lifting the Export Ban. Despite their efforts, 
the ban remained in place until the balance of power shifted 
to Alaska's favor upon election of the 103rd Congress.
The Republican sweep of Congress during the mid-term 
November 1994 election brought to power two Alaskans as
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chairs of important committees. Don Young was charged with 
chairing the House Resource Committee and Frank H. Murkowski 
assumed chairmanship of the Senate Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee. Furthermore, their ascendancy was 
preceded by a Department of Energy report which found that 
lifting the ban would create an estimated eleven thousand 
new jobs and raise GDP by a half-billion dollars by the end 
of the decade (Department of Energy, March 1990).
Murkowski introduced a bill to lift the export ban 
(S395) on February 13, 1995 in the Senate. Given the Energy 
Department's report, the bill was supported by the Clinton 
administration. The main opposition in the Senate was Patty 
Murray (D-WA), who attempted a filibuster to block 
consideration of the bill on May 15, 1995. Murkowski agreed 
to bring up consideration of a second bill which did not 
contain language that the Clinton administration would 
support. This ended Murray's filibuster attempt since the 
bill would be vetoed even if it passed. Murkowski then 
brought a vote to table the second version of the bill. It 
was tabled in an 80-6 vote on May 15, 1995, effectively 
killing the second bill and any chance that Murray would 
filibuster the first bill. On May 16, 1995, Murkowski's 
first version of the bill passed 74-25 in the Senate 
(Congressional Quarterly Weekly, May 20, 1995, p. 1416- 
1417). Murkowski stated after the vote:
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"For more than two decades [Alaskans] have been 
discriminated against by this illogical 
prohibition that has prevented Alaska from 
exporting one of its most important resource 
commodities. Finally, Alaska is on the verge of 
being treated as a full state" (Anchorage Daily 
News, Wednesday, May 17, 1995, p. 6.)
However, the bill passed by the Senate included a
provision that exempted certain oil companies from paying
royalties if they were operating in waters deeper than 200
meters in the Gulf of Mexico. The provision was placed
there by J. Bennett Johnston (D-LA). Johnston claimed it
was there to encourage oil production in deep water where it
was presently uneconomic to produce known reserves. It
would be the major source of controversy in the passage of
the bill.
On July 24, 1995, the House followed the Senate by 
passing its own version of the bill (HR70) in a 324-77 vote. 
This was followed by a voice vote on July 25, 1995 in which 
the House substituted the text of its own bill for the text 
of the Senate bill to send the bill to conference committee. 
The major difference between the House and Senate versions 
was with the Johnston royalty exemption. This was opposed 
in the House by George Miller (D-CA), who on July 25, 1995 
proposed a non-binding resolution to instruct the conferees 
to insist that the royalty exemption not be included in the 
final bill. The resolution passed 261-161. Another 
amendment by Miller, that would allow exports only if the
oil was in excess of that which could be used in Washington, 
Oregon, California, Nevada, or Arizona (not Alaska!), was 
also rejected 95-310 on July 25, 1995. Also rejected on 
July 25, 1995 was an amendment by Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) which 
would have required that U.S. flag vessels be used to export 
oil in all cases. (The bill under consideration allowed 
non-U.S. vessels when U.S. vessels were not available.)
This amendment was rejected 117-278.
The conference committee met with the House members 
operating under the Miller instructions to demand removal of 
the royalties exemption in late September and early October, 
1995. Representing the House were Don Young, George Miller, 
and Ken Calvert (R-CA). Both Young and Calvert supported 
the royalty exemption, with Young arguing that House members 
did not understand what they were voting on in the Miller 
amendment. The conference bill was reported on October 9, 
1995 with the royalty exemption included. On November 8, 
1995 the House began consideration of the conference bill. 
Miller again introduced an amendment to strip the royalty 
exemption from the bill. This amendment failed 160-261. The 
final bill was approved by the House on November 13, 1995 
with a vote of 289-134. The Senate approved the conference 
committee bill on November 14, 1995 with a 69-29 vote. 
President Clinton signed the bill into law on November 28, 
1995. Shortly thereafter, British Petroleum (the major
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Alaskan oil producer) announced that it would begin its 
first exports, about four tanker-loads per year, to Taiwan 
in June, 1996.2
2.7 Interest Group Competition
The final bill had three primary effects: it lifted
the oil export ban; it provided for a royalty exemption in 
deep waters in the Gulf of Mexico; and it provided that 
exports would mainly, though not exclusively, be transported 
by U.S. flagged vessels. The first two clearly benefited 
crude oil producers. Lifting the oil export ban would, 
however, cause prices paid by oil refineries to rise and 
consequently would be opposed by west coast refineries. The 
royalty exemption, on the other hand, would increase the 
supply of oil and be supported by both crude oil producers 
and oil refineries. While the shipping component clearly 
benefits the U.S. maritime industry, that industry failed to 
achieve what it desired in the Gejdenson amendment. So 
overall the maritime industry lost a share of the market.
The maritime industry should oppose the legislation 
excluding the Gejdenson amendment. The final affected group 
is the environmentalist organizations. Miller's opposition 
to the royalty exemption was in part a desire to reduce oil 
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. Supporters of this
2 Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, May 30, 1996, p. 1.
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exemption such as Johnston and Young pointed out that the 
exemption was designed to be revenue neutral (a point 
challenged by Miller, who claimed it would cost taxpayers 
$12.9 billion), since it would only apply to wells which 
would not be economic without the royalty exemption. Also, 
the environmentalists clearly drew a connection between 
lifting the ban and demands for opening the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) for oil drilling.3 "Once they build 
up demand overseas, they'll be coming back to us to say 
we've got to [open ANWR]," argued Patty Murray in the 
Senate. Thus the environmentalists are expected to oppose 
lifting the oil export ban.
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3 For example, the Senate budget resolution (S. Con. Res. 13) included a 
proposal to lease approximately eight percent of the 19 million acres of 
ANWR, estimated to bring in $1.4 billion in revenues to the federal 





The theoretical model is based on the seminal work 
by Gary S. Becker (1983). In Becker's model, the policy 
space is defined as a single dimension (Keith Poole and 
Thomas Romer 1985), which Becker takes to be the per 
member dollar value of the transfer either to or from the 
interest group. This is referred to as the policy, and 
denoted as x.
Let there be n interest groups, and assume without 
loss of generality that the interest groups are ordered 
in policy space according to their preferences. In 
particular, let the preferred policy of group i be
denoted as x", and the ordering be
Assume that the cost to group i of a policy x 
depends upon the distance between the preferred policy 








where c'> 0 and c"> 0 . Thus policy costs are symmetric,
positive and convex, with zero policy costs if the 
adopted policy is exactly what the group prefers.
Assume that each interest group is able to exert 
pressure on the government to affect policy. In 
particular, let the adopted policy be
m n
(3) x = x0 + £*/ '
/=1 i = m + 1
where x0 is the initial policy level, xt is the effective
political pressure applied by group i, and m is the 
highest index of those groups attempting to push the 
policy to the left of initial policy. All of the n-m 
groups to the right of m attempt to push the policy to 
the right and all the m groups, those to the left of and 
including m, attempt to push the policy to the left.
Which group is designated as m is endogenous and will 
depend upon the initial policy x0 as well as the relative 
strengths of the n interest groups. See figure 1.
Let the cost of effective political pressure be
(4 ) Wt =w t (*.) ,
where w(0) = 0, w' > 0, and w"> 0 . Thus interest group i 
chooses jc(. to minimize the sum of the policy costs and 
political pressure costs. Becker (1983) shows that the 
solution to this problem, assuming all other groups have 
chosen political pressure levels x* is to choose
political pressure x* such that the objective function
(5) Ci(x) + wi(xi) = TCj i = l,...,n
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is minizized, e.g.,
(6) -C'(x) + w[(xi)= 0 , i = 1, ...,n
This states that the ith interest group equates marginal 
policy costs with marginal political pressure costs which 
yields
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■1) -C' - ' Z X‘+ 'ZX' + <(*.■) = °' i = 1, . n.
V  1=1 i = m  +  \ /
The testable hypothesis concerns how the optimal 
political pressure level x* is related to the optimal 
political pressure level x* for other interest groups. 
Totally differentiate (7) for some i > m:
m n
(8 ) [c'{x) + w'(x*)\dxi -  c'{x)^ dx] + C '{x)YJdx] = 0
y =  l  j  =  m +1V*''
Thus
dx* —C (x):9) ~yr = r , / .M<0 i'J > rn (or i, j < m) ,[c,tx)+w'(x;)]
and,
dx* C (r)(10) = > 0 i > m, j < m (or i < m, j > m) ,
dXj [c ;{x)+w'(xi )\
see figure 3.2 for pictorial descriptions of (9) and 
(10) .
Equations (9) and (10) are simply the slopes of the 
reaction functions in xj and xjt space. These equations
state that an increase in political pressure by a group 
on the same side of an issue as interest group i will 
cause interest group i to reduce its level of political 
pressure. That is, the interest group will freeride on 
the efforts of the other group. Conversely, an increase 
in political pressure by an interest group on the 
opposite side of an issue from group i will cause group i 
to increase its level of political pressure. This is the 
familiar positive sloped reaction function of Becker 
(1983) for competing interest groups.
40
41
Figure 3.1 Graphical representation of interest group
policy.
0 X0 Xn
Existing policy, x0 resides at some point along xn possible policies. All 
interest groups with policies, xm attempt to push the existing policy to 
the left of xg and all interest groups with policies xa_m attempt to push 
the existing policy to the right of x0 .
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Figure 3.2 Interest group reaction functions.
The reaction functions, for interest groups x; and jc; , with slopes (9) and 




Much has been made in the literature about whether 
there is slackness in the performance of politicians (Kau 
and Rubin 1982, Kalt and Zupan 1984, Peltzman 1984, John R. 
Lott and Michael L. Davis, 1992). Each congressman's 
unexplained ideology is measured by the residuals obtained 
from Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimates of 
that congressman's observed ideology.
To measure observed ideology two voting indexes were 
used, the League of Conservation Votes (LCV) and the 
National Security Index (NSI). The LCV measures the percent 
a congressman votes in a manner desired by the League of 
Conservation Voters, that is, a high rating would reflect a 
tendency to vote for conservation issues. A high NSI rating 
suggests the congressman votes in favor of issues relevent 
to the American Security Council. The NSI was chosen to 
represent the argument that keeping the export ban was to 
maintain national security (U.S. Department of Energy, 1990,
p. 28) .
All congressmen elected in the 1994 elections were used 
in the contributions equations, and all congressmen who 
voted, or paired with another absent voter, or announced a 
position prior to the vote, in the voting equations. This
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means that the votes of newly elected congressmen were 
included in the data set. Ratings indexes, such as LCV and 
NSI, are computed using votes from previous years, so there 
is no ratings data available for newly elected congressmen.
Incumbent congressmen are distinguished from freshman 
congressmen with a voting index. Since no observations on 
the LCV and NSI indexes for newly elected congressmen exist, 
a zero is substituted for the residual corresponding to the 
index for newly elected congressman. A dummy variable, 
FRESHMAN, is included and is equal to one for newly elected 
congressmen and zero otherwise. So, the mean effect for a 
newly elected congressman's unexplained (i.e., unobserved) 
ideology is measured by the variable, FRESHMAN.
Let the dependent variable, xik represent the ideology
rating, as determined by the League of Conservation Voters 
(LCV) and by the National Security Index (NSI), and observed 
for politician k so the specification for a congressman's 
ideology is:
(9) xik =n, +<p1.xii +\\ftPlk +\i,cik +eik , i=l I k=l K
where K is the number of observations (i.e., 344 incumbent 
representatives) and I is the number of ideology ratings to 
be estimated (i.e. 2 ratings, LCV and NSI). The independent 
variable takes the value of one when the representative 
is a Republican and zero when the representative is a
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Democrat. The variable, C, is a matrix of constituent 
demographic measures. The matrix variable reflects 
percentage of the population belonging to environmental 
groups and employed in the merchant marine, oil production 
and oil refining industries.
After The estimated residuals for the LCV and NSI are 
renamed RLCV and RNSI and are measures of the ith 
legislator's unexplained ideology.
4.2 Campaign Contributions
Let yik denote the level of campaign contributions
observed by interest group i to politician k. The theoretic 
model suggests the following econometric specification for 
predicting yik :
n
(10) yik = a ; +XP;?;* +Y,-XU + 5,.X2* + OZ, +eik ,
./=! 
i *  i
i = 1, ... ,n k = 1, . . . , K 
where K is the number of observations (i.e., 435 
representatives) and n is the number of interest groups 
(i.e., 4 groups). For interest group i, the matrix Xxk
represents observations on costs identified with the ban 
measured by industry concentration within each Jcth 
representative's district e.g., demand measures such as 
propensity for the congressman to vacillate on policy
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(Gardner 1987) . The matrix X2k , represents observations on
political pressure costs expressed as constituent 
demographics, e.g., group size of social and ethnic 
characteristics (Peltzman 1976, 1984) for interest group i. 
Finally, Zk is a matrix of variables identifying differences
in the politicians (Stratmann 1991, 1992a, Chappell 1981, 
1982, Jacobson 1980, Weingast and Marshall 1988). As long 
as there exist Xu or X2i variables that are distinct
between the interest groups, the equations in (10) are 
identified. As it is likely that the errors in equation i 
are correlated with the errors in equation j, the 
appropriate estimation procedure is three-stage least 
squares.
The hypothesis tests are with respect to the (3,̂
parameters. From equations (7) and (8) these parameters 
should be positive if competing or negative if cooperating. 
John R. Boyce (1995) has also shown that by taking into 
account the majority rule requirements in congress, it is 
possible to detect more sophisticated behavior such as 
Stackelberg relationships. In this case, the Stackelberg 
leader will have (3?/ = 0 and the followers will behave 
according to (7) and (8).
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4.3 Congressional Votes
In addition, if there are votes on particular bills 
affecting the various interest groups, the contributions 
should have some effect upon the votes. The model is of the 
following form:
n
( 11 ) Vlk — K ; + ̂  'h u9ik '*"̂1/̂1/ 1̂ 21 ® l̂ k eik I —1 , . . . , V k— 1 , . . . , K
/=!
where yjk is the predicted contribution from (10) and vjk is
the vote taken by congressman k on vote 1 = 1,..., V. The 
expected signs of the correspond to whether or not the







The empirical results are based on an analysis of 
contributions to members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives by four interest groups, oil producers, oil 
refineries, the merchant marine, and environmental 
organizations, and on six votes in the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 1995.1 The House votes were chosen 
because they offer a greater level of variation in the 
explanatory variables and their sample size is large enough 
to lend some confidence to the parameter estimates. The 
interest groups are defined broadly to include any firm with
an SIC code in its respective industry as they are listed in
the Dun's Business Rankings (1984).2
Table 1 shows statistics for contributions by the
interest groups to congressmen elected in the 1994
elections. The distinction between oil producers (CRUDE 
OIL) and oil refineries (REFINERY) is the most tenuous since 
there are a number of vertically integrated firms. Those
1 Empirical results for the 1979 Dannemeyer amendment and final bill are not 
included since these voters were not close. Also, the estimation results 
for the vote to bring the 1995 conference bill to the floor, HR 256, are not 
reported as the vote was not close and primarily occurred along ideological 
lines. All results are available upon request.
2 The groups included in each category are available. There are 35 merchant 
marine PACs, 95 oil company PACs, 10 refineries PACs, and 26 environmental 
organization PACs
refineries owned or controlled by oil producers may support 
legislation otherwise not supported by independent 
refineries. This contrary position of vertically integrated 
refineries is brought about the refinery's accountability to 
it's parent company. The contribution data covers the 
period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1994; it was the
most recent period for which contribution data were 
available when this project began.3 Use of this data is 
consistent with the Cournot assumption that an interest 
group's contribution decision is based upon the other 
groups' contributions from the previous period. Data for 
all 435 congressmen who were elected to the House of 
Representatives in the 1994 elections was used. In the 
contribution equations, a successful challenger was treated 
in the same way as a reelected incumbent.4
Table 1 shows statistics describing the data used in 
the analysis. The oil producers (CRUDE OIL) and merchant 
marine (SHIPPING) were the largest contributors, with 
congressmen averaging about four-thousand dollars each from 
these interest groups. The contributions by oil refineries
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3 Contribution data is now available for the period January 1, 1995 through 
December 31, 1995. However, the largest share of contributions are made
during the period just prior to an election (e.g., Lawrence Rothenberg and 
Noland McCarty, 1996), so using data during the first year of a two-year 
term would likely bias downwards the observed level of contributions. The 
1993-1994 data represents the major recent aid given to congressmen (and 
challengers) by the interest groups.
3 Below, this assumption is relaxed.
(REFINERY) and environmental organizations (GREEN) were 
substantially smaller, averaging around three-hundred 
dollars per congressman. Republicans took more money on 
average from oil producers and refineries, and less money on 
average from the merchant marine and environmentalists. Oil 
producers contributed to the most congressmen, with only 
seventy-eight congressmen elected in 1994 receiving zero 
contributions from crude oil producing companies. In 
contrast, environmentalists contributed to only seventy-five 
congressmen. Of these, all but 14 were Democrats.
5.2 Estimating the Unexplained Ideology-
Table 2 reports the regression results for the ideology 
indexes against various constituency and congressman- 
specific variables. The residuals are used as a measure of 
the "shirking" or unexplained ideology of the congressman.
As each independent variable is used in both ideology 
equations, seemingly-unrelated regression was used to 
correct for possible correlation in the error terms. This 
allows the number of observations to be equal (344) since 
anyone missing either or both indexes was omitted from the 
regression. As explained previously, all newly elected 
congressmen were omitted from both of these regressions due 
to the nonexistence of ideology ratings for these 
representatives. Below, they are given an unexplained
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ideology score of zero, and marked by an additional dummy 
variable FRESHMAN to separate out the effect of unexplained 
ideology scores of zero owing to the unobserved unexplained 
ideology scores.
As is usual in previous regression models attempting to 
explain the voting indexes, the constituency variables plus 
the party of the congressman explain about seventy percent 
of the variation in the indexes (Kalt and Zupan 1990). If 
the congressman is a Republican (REPUBLICAN =1), his LCV 
index drops about forty points and his NSI index increases 
by about forty points relative to Democrats. The liberal- 
conservative ideology of the constituency also affects the 
index significantly. For every one percent increase in the 
vote for Clinton (CLINTON) the LCV index rises by a point 
and the NSI drops by a point. Refinery employment is the 
only significant employment measures. An increase in 
refinery employment (REFEMP) decreases the LCV index and 
increases the NSI index for the congressman. Below, the 
estimated residuals are denoted as RLCV and RNSI, 
respectively.
5.3 Contributions Equation Estimation
Two sets of regressions were run on the contribution 
and voting equations. Three-stage least squares was used in 
the first round to estimate the contributions equations.
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For the second series of regressions, two-stage Tobit 
estimation procedure was used on the contributions 
equations. The estimated value of contributions obtained 
from these procedures are later used in the congressional 
voting equations.
The contribution equations, 3.9 and 3.10, were 
estimated to account for the correlation among contributions 
between various interest groups. The control variables are 
the employment shares of the respective industries (EMPLOY 
and EMPLOY2). This data is the employment share and 
employment share squared of the industry for whom the 
contribution equation is estimated. For the matter of 
contributions by environmental organizations, in lieu of the 
employment share, the number of adults per 1000 registered 
as members in any of six major environmental organizations 
was used. These variables identify the system. Following 
Stratmann (1991), this equation is estimated using a 
quadratic (e.g., EMPLOY and EMPLOY2) relationship between 
the contributions to a congressman by an interest group and 
the relative size of that group in the congressman's 
state.5,5 A bell-shaped contribution equation is expected,
5 District data on employment by sector was not available. These are expressed 
as the state's share (percent) of employment attributed to each sector
6 The environmental data is statewide per capita membership in six major 
environmental organizations (Audobon Society, Environmental Defense Fund, 
Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, and World Wildlife 
Society.) Data courtesy of Mark Zupan.
implying the linear term is positive and the squared term is 
negative in sign. Congressmen who have a large share of a 
specific industry in their state are already responding to 
the pressure that group exerts as a voting force (e.g., 
Denzau and Munger, 1986). Conversely, a congressman with a 
minuscule share of the industry is not likely going to 
support the industry even with a large contribution. 
Furthermore, as only a majority is required to pass a bill, 
the expectation is that contributions are concentrated in 
the center.7
Other control variables include the party of the 
congressman (REPUBLICAN), the vote in the congressman's 
congressional district for Bill Clinton in the 1992 
presidential election (CLINTON), the margin of victory of 
the congressman in the 1994 elections (MARGIN), whether the 
congressman is a member of the House Resources Committee 
(HRESOURCE) indexed as a one if the congressman is a member 
of the Committee), the per capita BTU consumption per year 
from petroleum sources in the Congressman's state (OILBTU), 
median family income (INCOME) in the district, the percent 
of the district that lives in a suburban area (SUBURB), the
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This is not entirely the case, since legislators do more than vote on a 
bill. They also offer support by sponsoring a bill, speaking out for a bill, 
or engaging in log-rolling agreements to pass a bill. Thus Stratmann (1992a) 
estimates a switching regression model to capture the median legislature 
phenomenon, and estimates a U-shaped quadratic on the right-hand side 
regression to capture the services effect.
unobserved ideology of the congressman (RLCV and RNSI), and 
the FRESHMAN variable.
5.3.1 3SLS Estimation of the Contribution Equation
Table 3 contains the parameter estimates for the three- 
stage least squares estimation of the contribution equation. 
Of the twelve reaction function slope coefficients, all but 
two are statistically significant and all twelve have the 
expected sign. That is, these results indicate that the oil 
producers faced opposition from the merchant marine, oil 
refineries, and environmentalists, while the latter three 
groups made contributions consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of equations (7) and (8).
None of the employment share variables is statistically 
significant. This is a problem since these variables were 
used to identify the system. Republicans get significantly 
higher contributions from oil producers, but significantly 
lower contributions from the other three interest groups. 
Members of the House Resources committee received 
significantly higher contributions from merchant marine, oil 
refineries, and environmentalists, but not from oil 
producers. Congressmen with a lower margin of victory in 
the 1994 election received lower contributions from everyone 
but the oil producers. Congressmen from districts with 
higher median family income received higher contributions
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from all groups but the oil producers. The only interest 
group more likely to contribute to freshmen was the oil 
producers.
5.3.2 Two-Stage Tobit Estimation of Contributions Equations
As the contributions a congressman receives are bounded 
from below, a number of previous researchers used a Tobit 
model to estimate contributions (e.g., Chappell 1981, 1982, 
Stratmann 1991). As contributions by other interest groups 
are jointly determined, a two-stage method of estimating the 
equation is used. In the first stage, a Tobit reduced form 
model of the contributions as a function of all of the 
exogenous variables in the system is estimated. At stage 
two, the predicted values of the contributions from the 
reduced form equations are used as instruments for the 
contributions of the other interest groups' contributions.
Table 4 presents the results for the two-stage Tobit 
estimation of the contributions equation. The significance 
of the contributions variables drops substantially when 
using the two-stage Tobit model. Only three of the twelve 
contributions coefficients are significant in this case.
The signs are as expected in all but the oil refineries 
equation, where the signs are opposite as expected for 
SHIPPING and CRUDE OIL, though insignificant. Again, with
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these two exceptions, the signs are consistent with the 
theoretical model.
In the Tobit model, the employment share variables are 
significant in two equations, SHIPPING and CRUDE OIL. For 
SHIPPING, the bell-shaped relationship between contributions 
and employment share is found. However, for CRUDE OIL, there 
is simply a positive relationship between oil employment and 
the contributions. The remaining variables in the system 
behave primarily as they did in the 3SLS equation estimates.
5.4 Congressional Votes
There were seven votes recorded by teller in the House. 
All votes were used except House Resolution 256 (HRES256),
which was the vote to move the conference bill (FINAL) to 
the floor for consideration.8 For each of the votes, a 
"yes" vote is recorded as a one and a "no" vote is recorded 
as a zero. Following the standard convention, paired and 
announced votes are included as if they were cast votes in 
the intended direction. The explanatory variables include 
estimates from the three-stage least squares (or two-stage 
Tobit) contributions equations, similar constituency 
variables as in the contributions equations, and measures of 
unobserved ideology for the congressman regarding 
environmental and national security issues.
8 That vote did not have nearly the significance of the remaining votes, and 
was generally along party lines.
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5.4.1 Probit Estimation of Voting Model Using 3SLS 
Contribution Estimates
Table 5 contains the probit estimation results for each 
of the six votes. The only two amendments which were 
significantly influenced by interest group competition are 
the two amendments by George Miller to strip the oil 
royalties exemption from the final bill. Both amendments 
were opposed by legislators who took contributions from the 
oil producers and from the refineries. That both groups 
would oppose the bill is consistent with lobbying efforts 
during the debate over the legislation.
The ideology variables seemed most significant in 
explaining the votes. Republicans and those legislators 
with high unexplained NSI indexes (RNSI) supported the House 
bill and the final bill and opposed each of the amendments. 
Congressmen from districts with strong Clinton support in 
1992 and with high median family incomes voted against the 
House and final bills and for the amendments. The only 
interest group competition variable that is significant is 
the OILBTU variable which measures the amount of energy 
consumption per capita from oil. This variable has the same 
signs as the RNSI and REPUBLICAN variables.
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5.4.2 Probit Estimates of Votes Using Two-Stage Tobit 
Contribution Estimates
Table 6 contains the estimates of the voting equations 
when the Tobit estimates are used as instruments for the 
contributions. This estimation provides considerably more 
support for the interest group competition hypothesis. In 
three of the six votes, the fitted contributions by the four 
interest groups are statistically significant. The three 
non-significant voter were those in which only one of the 
groups gained from the amendment (e.g., US FLAG affects 
shipping primarily and the two ROYALTY votes affect 
environmentalists and oil producers primarily). The only 
group for whom contributions did not seem to affect a vote 
were the environmentalists. The merchant marine and oil 
refineries opposed the House bill and final bills and the 
oil producers supported them, as expected. The oil producers 
also opposed the EXCESS amendment and the two ROYALTY 
amendments. The only odd result was that the merchant 
marine supported the R0YALTY2 amendment which is unexpected 
since the merchant marine was not effected by the amendment.
The REPUBLICAN, RNSI, and CLINTON variables behaved as 
they did when 3SLS instruments were used. The result of the 
FRESHMAN variable is intriguing when two-stage Tobit 
instrument is employed. The variable was only significant 
(and positive) in the ROYALTYl estimation when 3SLS
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estimates were applied. However, when using the two-stage 
Tobit instruments, a FRESHMAN variable with the opposite 
sign of the REPUBLICAN variable is produced. Under this 
analysis, the freshmen congressmen, who are mainly 
Republicans, voted against the party lines on most of these 
issues.
None of the bills were supported by environmentalists 
according to the contributions data, so an alternate premise 
is set forth that environmentalists produce pressure through 
direct means rather than through campaign contributions.
So, the probit equations include the variable ENVMEMB which 
is the statewide membership per one thousand adults in six 
major environmental organizations. Table 7 shows the 
results. The ENVMEMB variable is significant with the 
expected sign in six of the seven votes. The only vote 
where it is insignificant is the R0YALTY1 vote, giving 
credibility to Congressman Don Young's statement that 
members of the House were confused about the issue. Thus it 
appears that environmentalists did affect the votes, though 
not by campaign contributions. However, when the variable 
ENVMEMB is included, the significance of the contributions 
variables decreases. Both cases with REFINERY significant 
in Table 6 are no longer statistically significant in Table 




This research developed and tested a model of interest 
group competition between a small number of highly organized 
interest groups. The basic theoretical model follows 
Becker's (1983) contribution by specifying and estimating 
the reaction functions for the level of contributions for 
the interest groups. The testable hypothesis is that groups 
who compete have positively sloped reaction functions and 
groups who cooperate have negatively sloped reaction 
functions.
The empirical application pertained to legislation 
aimed at lifting the Alaska oil export ban. Six votes 
during 1995 were analyzed along with the contributions to 
politicians during the 1993-1994 election cycle. A three- 
stage least squares and a two-stage Tobit model was used to 
estimate the slopes of the reaction functions in the 
contributions equations. The results using the three-stage 
least squares model were highly encouraging. Evidence of 
cooperation among those interest groups opposed to lifting 
the Alaska oil export ban and evidence of competition 
between these groups and the crude oil producing companies, 
who stood to gain from lifting the ban. The evidence using 
the two-stage Tobit model was less convincing. Out of 
twelve coefficients on the reaction function parameters,
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only three were significant, though all but two had the 
expected sign.
In regards to the probit estimation of six votes on 
various aspects of the oil export ban during 1995, 
consistent evidence exists that oil producers' contributions 
affected the votes in the direction expected. Results were 
mixed with regard to the other three interest groups. Using 
the three-stage least squares model, oil producers and oil 
refineries contributions affected votes in the same 
direction on the R0YALTY1 and R0YALTY2 amendments.
By using the Tobit instrumental variables results, the 
estimates were improved. Environmentalists' contributions 
were generally insignificant, suggesting that contributions 
are a minor tactic used by environmentalists to influence 
legislation. This was supported by the results in Table 7 
which included the relative size of the environmental 
organizations within states. That variable was significant 
in six of the seven regressions with the expected signs. 
Merchant marine contributions behaved generally as expected 
in the final bills. This supports the reaction function 
model of interest group contribution, and when using the 
Tobit instrumental variables, support for the hypothesis 
that the contributions affected policy is provided.
A number of caveats are in order. The empirical model 
tests the aggregate effect of all other interest group
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pressure on one group's contributions. In terms of the 
theoretical model, this is represented by a total 
differential with respect to the ith interest group.
However, the theoretical model derived in Chapter 3 holds 
n-2 groups' pressure constant and specifies a change in the 
ith interest group's pressure as a result of change in 
pressure by the jth interest group, which is represented in 
the theoretical model by the partial derivatives in 3.9 and 
3.10. This disparity prohibits support of the theoretical 
model with the empirical results.
Varying interest groups may have several different 
policies about which they are concerned and contributions 
may have been directed at influencing other bills. For 
example, major concerns for environmentalists during this 
time period included reauthorization of the Superfund 
legislation and the Endangered Species Act. This may have 
effected estimates of the reaction function slopes.
Additionally, the weakness and inconsistency 
surrounding the results in both estimates of oil refinery 
contributions coupled with the appearance of competing 
interests among oil refineries suggest that further research 
regarding this variable is in order. Defining oil 
refineries as two unique interest groups, independents and 
vertically integrated, may yield more encouraging results in 
estimating the contributions equation.
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Evidence was found, however, that politicians, at 
least, are able to distinguish between policies and their 
affects on interest groups. For example, contributions by 
oil refineries could affect votes in the same direction as 
contributions by oil producers or in the opposite direction, 
depending upon whether the interests of both were being 
fulfilled by the amendment. It is also well known that if 
there are multiple dimensions to the policy space then there 
may not be a unique equilibrium (Mueller 1989). In one 
sense, the fact that the policy changed only after 
Republicans gained control of Congress supports the notion 
that agenda dictates outcome. The findings of this study 
does not diminish support for this view. What is supported, 
however, is that given the agenda of the 104th Congress, the 
outcome was influenced by interest group competition. The 





Table 1: 1993-1994 Contributions by Interest Groups to US
House of Representatives
House
"NAME N MEAN ST.DEV. MIN. MAX. MEDIAN ZEROS
SHIPPING 435 3478.6 5460 . 5 0 33000 1500 150
CRUDE OIL 435 4162.6 5021.6 0 38850 2500 78
REFINERY 435 374.7 557. 9 0 4250 0 263
GREEN 435 299 . 9 1083 . 6 0 8910 0 360
Republicans
"NAME N MEAN ST.DEV MIN. MAX. MEDIAN # ZEROS
SHIPPING 231 2173 . 2 4379. 6 0 32020 500 108
CRUDE OIL 231 4831 . 1 4651.4 0 31200 3750 30
REFINERY 231 452 . 8 568.2 0 4250 0 118
GREEN 231 115.4 660. 9 0 6570 0 217
Democrats
"NAME N MEAN ST. DEV. MIN. MAX. MEDIAN # ZEROS
SHIPPING 204 4956.8 6154.8 0 33000 2500 42
CRUDE OIL 204 3402.2 5323 . 3 0 38850 1500 48
REFINERY 204 286.3 533.6 0 2750 0 145
GREEN 204 508.8 1390.3 0 8910 0 143
Includes only congressmen (incumbents and challengers) elected in 1994 
elections.
“ Number of congressmen elected in 1994 receiving no contribution from each 
interest group.
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Table 2: Seemingly-Unrelated Regression Estimation of LCV
and NSI Indexes
League of Conservation 
Voters Index LCV)




PARTY -40 .262 39.541



















OILBTU 0.0619 -0 .0515
(1.384) (-1.116)
Adj . R2 0.6688 0.7035
N 344 344
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%
(asymptotic t-ratios)
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Table 3: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of the
Contribution Equation
















EMPOYMENT2 (103)2 -9.171 
(-0.300)






SHIPPING --- 0 . 75182 





CRUDE OIL 0.65128 
***(2.850)

















HRESOURCES 7089 . 9 
***(2.677)






PARTY -5813 . 4 
***(-3.074)
3830.6 





















































*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%
(asymptotic t-ratios)
Constant is ommitted. N = 435. 
b Membership in six major environmental organizations per 1000 adults is used 
instead of employment.
Wald test statistic on joint significance of contributions variables 
(d.f.).
d Wald test statistic on joint significance of all variables in regression 
(d.f.).
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Table 3: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of the
Contribution Equation















-6 . 0731 
(-1. 059)








*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%
(asymptotic t-ratios)
Constant is ommitted. N = 435. 
b Membership in six major environmental organizations per 1000 adults is used
instead of employment.
Wald test statistic on joint significance of contributions variables 
jd.f.).
Wald test statistic on joint significance of all variables in regression 
(d.f.) .
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Table 4: Two-Stage Tobit Estimation of the ContributionEquation







































-0 . 91353 
(-0.356)

















PARTY -3489 . 9 
***(-3.149)
1969 . 5 
** (2 .196)


























-85 . 132 
*** (-2 . 747)
FRESHMAN -4542 . 1 
***(-4.038)












69 . 881 
** (2.279)








*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%
(asymptotic t-ratios)
These are regression coefficients, rather than normalized coefficients. 
Constant is omitted. N = 435. 
b Membership in six major environmental organizations per 1000 adults is used 
instead of employment.
W a l d  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  o n  j o i n t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  v a r i a b l e s  
j d .  f .  ) .
d Wald test statistic on joint significance of all variables in regression 
(d.f.).
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T a b l e  4: T w o - S t a g e  T o b i t  
E q u a t i o n
E s t i m a t i o n o f  t h e  C o n t r i b u t i o n
























*** (10 . 863)
f(3) ' 
X2(15) d






2 . 148 
***75.309
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90% 
(asymptotic t-ratios)
These are regression coefficients, rather than normalized coefficients. 
Constant is omitted. N = 435. 
b Membership in six major environmental organizations per 1000 adults is 
used instead of employment.
Wald test statistic on joint significance of contributions variables 
jd.f.).
Wald test statistic on joint significance of all variables in regression 
(d.f.).
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Table 5: Probit Estimation of the Voting Equations Using
3SLS Estimates of Contributions
































































































































-0 . 02144 
(-1.579)




















































-0 . 00702 
(-1.150)
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%
(asymptotic t-ratios)
Constant is omitted. 
b Wald test statistic on joint significance of contributions variables 
(d.f.).
Wald test statistic on joint significance of all variables in regression
(d.f.).
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Table 5: Probit Estimation of the Voting Equations Using
3SLS Estimates of Contributions



















WHITE -0.00207 0.00407 -0.01174 0 .01738 0.00668 -0 .014252



























N 407 404 407 426 424 425
X2(4) * 4 . 444 4.897 3 . 868 **9.493 7. 501 2. 933
X(15) c * * * * * * * * * k k k k k k246.629 200.986 135.360 217 .175 259.531 234.892
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90% 
(asymptotic t-ratios)
Constant is omitted. 
b Wald test statistic on joint significance of contributions variables 
(d.f.).
Wald test statistic on joint significance of all variables in regression 
(d.f.).
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Table 6: Probit Estimation of the Voting Equations Using
2S-Tobit Estimates of Contributions


























(0.302) *(1.646) (-2.962) (0.337) (2.026) (-3 .489)
CRUDEOIL
(10J) 0.10274 -0.41304•* * 0.69703 -0 .13307 -0.21348 0.43380
(0.382) (-2.430) (3.600) * (-1.738) (-1.604) (2.667)
REFINERY
(io3) -1.0568 -0.19114 -4.3755•* * -0.90170 -1. 2226 -3.1579•* *














PARTY -2.2459 -0.97999•* * 0.73775 -1.5321 -0.88163* * 0.57886
(-5.581) (-2 .452) *(1.876) (-4.455) (-2.535) (1.582)
RNSI -0.01026 -0.00875 0.00734 -0.00901 -0.01617 0.01700
*(-1.749) (-1.447) (1.156) (-1.601) (-2.938) (2.950)
























FRESHMAN 0.17889 0.89646•* * -1.4074 0 . 81044•* * 0.85670* *
-1 .3166
(0.396) (1.961) (-3.051) (2.419) (2.157) (-3.174)
CLINTON 0.04194 0.01787 -0.03501•* * 0.02786 0.017187 -0.03532* *











-0 . 02455 
(-1.384)
URBAN -0.01515 -0.00436 0.01303 -0.00781 -0.00098 -0 . 00563
(-2.109) (-0.635) * (1.731) (-1.354) (-0.160) (-0.846)
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90% 
(asymptotic t-ratios)
Constant is omitted. 
b Wald test statistic on joint significance of contributions variables 
(d.f.).
Wald test statistic on joint significance of all variables in regression
(d.f.).
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Table 6: Probit Estimation of the Voting Equations Using
Two-Stage Tobit Estimates of Contributions



















WHITE -0.00259 0 . 00289 -0 . 01208 0 . 01662 0 . 00300 -0.012462
(-0.339) (0.405) *(-1.695) ** (2.258) (0.426) *(-1.729)
INCOME
(103) 0.04784 0.00549 0 . 03265 0.05709* * * 0.02245 0.03725
** (2.079) (0.247) (1.501) (2.740) (1.112) * (1.783)
OILBTU
(103) -0.77264 0.29932 -4.7509 -7.1996■* ★ -3.0651 4 . 5559
(-0.250) (0.070) (-1.086) (-2.489) (-0.828) (1.125)
N 407 404 407 426 424 425
r < 4> b 1.943 **9.739 ***17.539 4 . 114 7 . 059 ***18.999
X2 (15) c •k k k * * * k k k * * * ■k k k k k k244.031 207 .363 153 .389 211.743 259 .414 254.442
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%
(asymptotic t-ratios)
Constant is omitted.
Wald test statistic on joint significance of contributions variables 
(d.f.) .
Wald test statistic on joint significance of all variables in regression 
(d.f.) .
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Table 7: Probit Estimation of the Voting Equations Using
Two-Stage Tobit Estimates of Contributions, Per 
Capita Environmental Membership Included




















(103) -0.1222 0.0594 -0.2254 -0 . 0219 0.1819 -0.3107
(-0.829) (0.358) (-1.318) (-0.150) (1.202) (-1. 992)
CRUDEOIL
(10") 0 .1078 -0.3346★ ★ 0.5679 -0.1191 -0 . 1877 0.37052



























PARTY -2.4451★ * * -1.4257★ * * 1.2573★ * * -1.6768★ * * -1.1069* * ★ 0.9551
(-5.796) (-3.192) (2.847) (-4.451) (-2.961) **(2.408)
RNSI -0.0097 -0.0090 0.0081 -0.0086 -0.0159★ ★ ★ 0.1639★ ★ ★

























FRESHMAN 0.0499 0.5609 -0.9730* * 0.7185* * 0.6820 -0.9590
(0.108) (1.152) (-1.993) (2.070) *(1.660) (-2.193)
CLINTON 0.0393 0.0156 -0.0336 0.0274 0.0156 -0.3562
**(2.310) (0 . 906) *(-1.879) *(1.862) (1.034) (-2.217)
SUBURB -0.0441 -0.0054 0.0207 -0.0214 -0.0163 -0.1048
(-2.162) (-0.265) (0.996) (-1.292) (-0.916) (-0.561)
URBAN -0.0180 -0.0087 0.0178 -0.0096 -0.0034 -0.1652
(-2.407) (-1.182) ** (2.213) (-1.591) (-0.536) (-0.235)
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%
(asymptotic t-ratios)
Constant is omitted. 
b Wald test statistic on joint significance of contributions variables 
(d.f.).
c Wald test statistic on joint significance of all variables in regression
(d.f.).
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Table 7: Probit Estimation of the Voting Equations Using
Two-Stage Tobit Estimates of Contributions, 
Environmental Membership Per State Included




























































































*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%
(asymptotic t-ratios)
Constant is omitted. 
b Wald test statistic on joint significance of contributions variables 
(d.f.).
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